La nueva arquitectura financiera internacional: lecciones y experiencias de África by Outa, Erick Rading
The new international financial 
architecture: Lessons and 
experiences from Africa
La nueva arquitectura financiera internacional: lecciones 
y experiencias de África
erick r. outa1
Received: 31/07/2014 Modified: 24/10/2014 Accepted: 02/11/2014
1 Adjunct Faculty Strathmore Business School and Researcher\Consultant. Nairobi, Kenya . 
Email:ericouta2002@yahoo.co.uk 
AD-minister Medellín-Colombia No. 25 julio-diciembre 2014 pp. 49 - 78 ISSN 1692-0279 e-ISSN: 2256-4322
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the requirements and successes of the New 
International Financial Architecture (NIFA) on transparency and corporate governance 
from a global perspective with a special focus on Africa. In recent years, transparency, 
accountability and governance have become key topics with many countries around 
the world having adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and 
corporate governance codes. The outcomes of these initiatives have been unconvincing. 
Desktop research was used to gather literature and data on compliance with corporate 
governance codes and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and other NIFA 
requirements. This study established that in spite of many regional and global initiatives 
by the World Bank and relevant regulators, compliance with IFRS and governance in parts 
of Africa has yet to reach its best level and guidelines are not fully followed leading to 
opportunities for improvement and policy adjustments. This research has implications 
and uses for both global and local institutions and regulators concerned with economic 
stability and growth including the World Bank, central banks, capital markets and boards 
of companies and the government in general. The findings contribute to governance 
debates by providing additional perspectives from Africa on compliance with accounting 
standards and codes in a region where research and corporate governance and reporting 
issues are still confusing. 
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Resumen
El propósito de este artículo es examinar los requisitos y los éxitos de la Nueva Arquitectura 
Financiera Internacional (NAFI) sobre transparencia y gobierno corporativo desde una perspectiva 
global, con enfoque especial en África. En los últimos años, la transparencia, la rendición de 
cuentas y el buen gobierno se han convertido en temas clave con muchos países de todo el mundo 
después de haber adoptado las Normas Internacionales de Información Financiera (NIIF) y los 
códigos de gobierno corporativo. Los resultados de estas iniciativas han sido poco convincentes. 
La investigación de escritorio se utiliza para recopilar literatura y los datos sobre el cumplimiento 
de los códigos de gobierno corporativo y las Normas Internacionales de Información Financiera 
(NIIF) y otros requisitos NAFI. En este estudio se estableció que, a pesar de las muchas iniciativas 
regionales y globales por parte del Banco Mundial y los organismos reguladores pertinentes, el 
cumplimiento con las NIIF y la gobernabilidad en algunas partes de África es todavía para llegar 
a su mejor momento y directrices no se siguen completamente dando lugar a oportunidades de 
mejora y ajustes de políticas. Esta investigación tiene implicaciones y usos tanto para instituciones 
como reguladores globales y locales que se ocupan de la estabilidad económica y el crecimiento 
como el Banco Mundial, los bancos centrales, los mercados de capital y los consejos de 
administración de las empresas y el gobierno en general. Los hallazgos contribuyen a los debates 
de gobierno al proporcionar perspectivas adicionales desde África sobre el cumplimiento de las 
normas de contabilidad y códigos en una región donde la investigación y la gestión empresarial y 
las cuestiones de presentación de informes son todavía factores de confusión. 
Palabras clave: 
Gobierno corporativo; Normas Internacionales de Información Financiera (NIIF); Nueva 
Arquitectura Financiera Internacional (NAFI), transparencia.
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Introduction
The question of Corporate Governance has been at the forefront around the world after 
the Asian Financial crisis of 1998 when intensified efforts to strengthen the international 
financial system resulted in the creation of a New International Financial Architecture 
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(NIFA). According to Singh and Newberry (2008, p. 1) NIFA requirements include corporate 
governance and compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). NIFA 
was conceptualized in April 1998, when finance ministers and Central Bank Governors from 
a number of significant economies met in Washington DC to examine issues related to the 
stability of the international financial system and the effective functioning of the global capital 
markets. They identified three action areas that would stabilize the international financial 
system: 1) enhancing transparency and accountability 2) strengthening domestic financial 
systems and 3) managing international financial crises. Under enhancing transparency, 
it was recommended that priority be given to compliance with and enforcement of 
high quality accounting standards to enhance the relevance, reliability, comparability 
and understandability of financial reports. The IMF was mandated to prepare a report 
summarizing the extent to which an economy meets internationally recognized disclosure 
standards. In this study, the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have been 
applied as a proxy for high quality accounting standards. Under strengthening domestic 
financial systems, the focus is on principles and policies that foster the development of a 
stable and efficient financial system including corporate governance and risk management.
According to Soederburg (2002), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank (WB) have used their considerable international surveillance powers to ensure that 
countries comply with NIFA, through the use of international standards such as IFRS, in 
accordance with what is known as the Report on Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC). According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (1998), members 
recognized that cooperation and coordination among national supervisors, regulators and 
international groups are crucial to the strengthening of domestic and financial systems. 
Bank for International Settlements is an intergovernmental organization of central banks 
that foster monetary and financial cooperation and serve as a bank for Central Banks. Its 
main objectives are monetary and financial stability.
Since NIFA came into being, IFRS have been rapidly spreading around the world. To 
date, over 100 countries have adopted the standards and the world’s biggest economy, the 
US, has endorsed the use of IFRS by issuing a road map for its adoption in the country even 
though there is a belief US GAAP is as good as or even better than IFRS. According to IAS 
plus (2010), IFRS refers to the entire body of the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) pronouncements including standards and interpretations approved by the IASB and 
the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). To date, there are 28 IAS and 
15 IFRS. Other authors have also explained that accounting standards state how particular 
types of transactions should be reflected on the financial statements. Each accounting 
standard is structured with an objective, scope, definition of applicable terms, accounting 
treatment, presentation, and disclosure. The arrangements ensure that the objectives of 
financial reporting, including disclosures, are met.
The African case is important. Questions have been raised as to whether Africa is still a 
dark continent given the continuing increases in foreign direct investment (the highest in any 
developing region), the recent hosting of the World Cup in South Africa and the discovery of 
oil and gas in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. It is estimated that Africa’s GDP in 2008 stood 
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at $1.6 trillion, equivalent to that of Brazil and Russia. The McKinsey quarterly report (2010) 
indicated that about half of Africa’s 1 billion populations will live in cities in 2030. 18 top cities 
in Africa will have a combined purchasing power equal to 8% of the total Africa GDP. Since 
2005 GDP growth on the continent has averaged 5.1% and the World Bank and many other 
development institutions have recognized Africa as the area for growth given Europe and 
the US are not registering major growth projections. Moreover, oil, gas and other minerals 
continue to be discovered in the continent while service industries are now major part of the 
GDP. The five top economies include South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco while 
the fastest growing ones include Ethiopia (7.5%), Mozambique (7.2%), Tanzania (6.8%), 
Congo (6.5%), Ghana (9%) and Zambia (7.6%) in 2013 see appendix 1 and 2. Even though 
growth rates in Africa have been criticized as excluding equity and wealth distribution, 
this unequal distribution mars progress and has been a source of many upheavals. Some 
corporate leaders have suggested that African economic growth will not be sustainable if 
the continent does not improve its reputation for corporate governance (Ramalho, 2013) 
and that Africa’s growth will be real only if it develops strong companies able to compete 
successfully in their home and overseas markets and that is best achieved through good 
corporate governance. Keeping Africa on governance trajectory is therefore timely as the 
anticipated and currently dismal wealth situation needs to be managed well and in the best 
interest of society so as to reach the predicted middle-income status by 2050.
In light of these debates, this study seeks to establish the extent to which corporate 
governance and financial reporting practices in Africa are in line with global best practices, 
and has applied desktop research to gather literature and data. The findings are that 
compliance with NIFA is still low though improving, and guidelines are not fully followed 
and this is manifested by the recurrence of financial crises, suspension of companies from 
securities exchanges, bailouts of companies, and bankrupt or collapsed companies. The 
study will be useful for both global and local institutions and regulators concerned with 
economic stability and growth. The World Bank, central banks, capital markets and boards 
of companies and organizations, investors and academics will find it useful.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature on corporate governance 
and codes, theories, global corporate lapses, IFRS and African overview of NIFA. Section 3 
reviews the situation on the ground regarding transparency and accountability by evaluating 
ROSC reports from selected countries in Africa. Section 4 covers strengthening of the domestic 
financial system and details general shortcomings in current corporate governance practices. 
Section 5 discusses findings and recommendations and section 6 concludes the paper by 
drawing on the lessons found in the study and then makes suggestions for future research. 
Literature Review
Corporate Governance
The principal agent paradigm enunciated by Fama (1980) raises the question on how 
to ensure that managers follow the interests of shareholders. Modern corporations are 
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characterized by a separation of ownership and control as they are run by professional 
managers (agents) who are not accountable to dispersed shareholders (principals). The 
principals must then solve two problems 1) how to select the most capable managers and 
2) address the moral hazard of giving the managers the right incentives to put forth efforts 
aligned with shareholder interests. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737) define corporate 
governance as a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves 
against expropriation by the insiders, a definition criticized for focusing too much on profit. 
There are many other definitions that try to put into perspective the motions of governance. 
These definitions state that corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers 
of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investments. 
The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) (2002) defined corporate governance as the 
system by which companies are governed and controlled. In view of these definitions, it’s 
widely accepted that bad governance leads to economic collapse. Indeed, many corporate 
scandals and the stock price collapses of companies such as Adelphia, Tyco and World 
com, Enron, (US) and Parmalat (Europe) are believed to be the result of poor governance 
(Brown & Caylor 2004). 
It has also been argued that good corporate governance structures encourage firms to 
create value and provide accountability and control systems commensurate with the risks 
involved. According to the Australian Stock Exchange (2003) good corporate governance 
is a necessary prerequisite that will attract investors, create competitive and efficient 
companies and business enterprises, enhance accountability and promote efficient use of 
limited resources. Similarly, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) (2009) has defined corporate governance as the internal means by which corporations 
are operated and controlled. Tan and Tan (2004) state that best run corporations recognize 
that business ethics and sensitivity to the interests of the environment and the society in 
which they operate can have an impact on the reputation and long-term performance of the 
organization. Furthermore, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond (2006) argue that applying 
the framework developed by Standards and Poor for evaluating governance provides 
compelling evidence that a variety of governance mechanisms explain credit ratings after 
controlling for other factors. In particular, the framework identifies four indicators that are 
associated with credit ratings. These are a negative association of block holders, positive 
relation to weaker shareholder rights and positive relationship to the degree of financial 
transparency and other board CEO relationships. 
The damage caused by corporate scandals has encouraged many governments, 
regulators and international organizations to initiate measures aimed at restoring investor 
confidence (Corporate Centre for Governance, 2006). There are many issues that draw 
attention to corporate governance and Montgomery (2007) cites the global recognition 
of corporate social responsibility, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998, and the economic 
scandals in the US and Europe. These scandals have been manifested through a decline 
in the value of stock prices, marketplace panics and a run on banks. The negative impact 
that such scandals have had on people are enormous leading to an urgent need for policy 
guidelines to prevent scandals in the future. 
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In the case of emerging economies, Montgomery (2007) takes the argument a notch 
higher by arguing that in developing countries, there are lost opportunities to mobilize 
financial resources on domestic and international markets as poor governance is associated 
with low returns. This view is also associated with the McKinseys & Company report (2002) 
where an investor opinion survey showed that companies with good corporate governance 
have a 12% increase in their market valuation. The findings also reported that over 73% of 
the investors in the world are willing to pay a premium for well-governed companies.
Corporate governance, it can be argued, is crucial because the impact occasioned by 
its absence or presence can be devastating or profitable. Commonwealth Association for 
Corporate Governance (CACG) (2006) rates the UK and Netherlands as front-runners in 
corporate governance compliance followed by Belgium, France and Germany while Norway, 
Portugal and Switzerland lag behind. 
Corporate Governance Codes
According to the World Bank (2005), corporate governance codes are sets of 
nonbinding recommendations aimed at improving and guiding the governance practices 
of corporations within a country’s specific legal environment and business context. They 
provide clear guidance for financial and non-financial disclosure, foster better engagement 
with minority shareholders and clarify the respective roles of managers and directors. Good 
corporate governance is supported by appropriate codes that are benchmarked to world 
standards. Most codes are voluntary and require firms to either comply or explain why they 
have not complied. A few others are regulatory and require mandatory compliance such 
as the Sarbanes Oxley Act commonly known as SOX 2002. Such codes include the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA) Kenya guidelines, SOX 2002 (USA), King II 2002 (SA) and the 
Higgs and Smith Report 2003 (UK), the European Commission’s Action Plan (EU) and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation’s (OECD) Corporate Governance Framework. Other 
global bodies engaged in corporate governance include the IFC, World Bank and regional 
development banks such as the African Development Bank.
Iliev (2010) has raised some very critical questions on the role of regulation as far as 
corporate governance is concerned. What is the optimal level of regulation for public firms? 
Are the costs of new regulations excessive? Can regulation improve the quality of financial 
reporting? And, ultimately, how does regulation affect the market valuation of firms? There 
are no clear answers to these questions but it is possible the poor implementation and 
outcomes of corporate governance reflects the inability to adequately respond to these 
questions.
Capital Market Authority (CMA) Kenya Guidelines 2002 no 3362
This was issued by the CMA and referred to as guidelines on corporate governance 
practices by publicly listed companies in Kenya gazette notice no 3362 to be applied as of 
the year ending 2002. It encouraged companies to comply and like all other voluntary codes, 
it is expected companies to identify reasons why they are not able to comply. Other private 
55AD-minister | Número 25 | julio-diciembre 2014 | ISSN 1692-0279 | e-ISSN: 2256-4322
sector non-listed companies were encouraged to comply too as a best practice. Section 
1.3 of the guidelines indicate that they have been developed taking into account the work 
that has been undertaken extensively by several jurisdictions through many task forces 
and committees including but not limited to the United Kingdom, Malaysia, South Africa, 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Commonwealth 
Association for Corporate Governance. Although a new one has been issued in 2011, 
companies in Kenya between 2007 and 2011 were expected to apply the 2002 act. The 
guidelines cover board structure, board committees, AGMs, shareholders, accountability 
and information audit and disclosure. 
In Kenya, the broad Corporate Governance structure is made up of the CAP 486 
Companies Act and other acts of parliament that include the state corporations act, the 
cooperatives act and the regulators that include the Insurance Regulatory Authority Act, 
Capital Markets Authority Act, the Central Bank Act, labor laws and many others. The existence 
of an independent judiciary and an independent press are considered crucial components of 
corporate governance and their impact is just beginning following the promulgamation of the 
new constitution in 2010. In 2014, these guidelines were reissued together with a blueprint 
for action in light of the problems experienced in several listed companies.
The Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002
Enacted in the USA in 2002 as a government response to the numerous corporate 
scandals that befell the country, the code focuses on the independent auditing of oversight 
boards, higher penalties for corporate wrongdoers (up to 20 years in prison for destroying 
or falsifying financial or audit information), extensive financial disclosures and avenues of 
recourse for aggrieved shareholders. SOX also provides for CEOs and CFOs to forfeit any 
financial gain received from bonuses and profits based on inaccurate financial results. While 
it was initially opposed by many corporations in 2002 as another endless list of regulations 
adding costs to businesses, subsequent surveys indicated that 60% of those surveyed 
thought that SOX had positive effects on firms while 70% of the directors thought that 
SOX had positive effects on the activities of the board of directors according to Stanwick 
(2008). The impact of SOX according to Reilly (2006) was the reduction and an expected 
further reduction in earnings restatements, which were 250 in 2000 and rose to 1,200 in 
2005. Another worry with SOX was the cost of implementation and which, according to 
Reilly (2006), was decreasing ($463,000 in 2004 to $223,000 in 2005) implying there are 
beneficial effects to complying with Sox. For African countries looking forward to sharing 
experiences from the west, it must be noted that cost, benefits and valuations are critical 
and recent scientific research is very skeptical about the benefits of mandatory regulation 
as opposed to voluntary codes. 
European Commission Action Plan 
According to Stanwick (2008), the framework falls into short, medium and long term 
with the short term requiring EU firms to explain their Corporate Governance structure in their 
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annual reports, including items such as shareholder rights, board of directors composition 
and operation, and this framework is commonly applied in Kenya. In the medium term, 
the European Action Plan recommends that firms be required to submit to shareholders 
their investment and voting policies as well as the kind of board structure they want to 
implement, and it is believed that the evaluation of the short and medium term will possibly 
lead to a long term horizon.
The organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
OECD revised the 1999 Corporate Governance framework in 2004, which included 
requirements for transparency and efficient market development. The significant elements 
of this framework include fair treatment of individual shareholders to same information, 
disclosure of conflict of interest, performance enhancement systems and the freedom of 
shareholders to raise concerns regarding illegal and unethical activities. 
King II and III report 2009
King II report in South Africa advocates for an integrated approach to good governance 
and incorporates emerging themes such as risk management, rights of the minority, and 
the reporting of non financial issues and has been supported by the revised Company’s 
Act of 2008. King III applies to all entities even though it has not received Company’s Act 
backing yet.
The Higgs and Smith Report
Targets audit committee composition and duties to monitor the integrity of financial 
controls and risk management.
Other Corporate Governance codes include the Combined Code prepared by the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) following the Turnbull 
Report and the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance. One of the 
criticisms of local corporate governance codes is contained in the CACG Guiding Principles 
for Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth (2006) that states that the globalization 
of the market place has ushered in an era where the traditional dimensions of corporate 
governance defined within local laws, regulations and national priorities are becoming 
increasingly challenged by circumstances and events with an international impact. 
The other side of this argument has been proposed by Accountants when promoting 
globing accounting standards (IFRS), where it has been argued that the adoption of one 
common global framework may not be practical. From an analysis of the codes, it can 
be argued that the diversity and similarities in both global and local codes are quite 
obvious but Stanwick (2008, p. 2) concludes that certain core standards are universal 
and can be applied anywhere by combining the good qualities of each frameworks while 
avoiding global standards that result in conflicts when applied locally as noted in law and 
accounting.
57AD-minister | Número 25 | julio-diciembre 2014 | ISSN 1692-0279 | e-ISSN: 2256-4322
Corporate Governance Theories
The theories that underpin these frameworks have been discussed in prior literature by 
Bruner (2011), Coffee (2005) and Leblac and Lilies (2003) and many others.
Bruner (2011, p. 309) argues that both sides of the Atlantic are engaged in proposals 
to empower shareholders in both financial and public companies with the belief that this 
would constrain reckless managers and curb risk taking that results in financial crises. This 
is based on the theory that corporate governance issues oscillate between the shareholders 
and board of directors. It is widely believed, according to Bruner (2011), that the current 
face of corporate governance proposals reflect a response to the last economic crisis of 
2007 that wrought havoc on banking systems in the US and the UK and which, many studies 
believe, was related to executive compensation. He argues that the case for corporate 
governance in non-financial sectors is weak since risk incentives and associated regulatory 
problems differ between the two domains. This partly explains why the banking sector in 
Kenya, has to comply with Central Bank regulations based on the Basle conventions, in 
addition to Capital Market Authority (CMA) rules that are applicable to all listed companies 
but are not a sufficient deterrent to bad governance. Bruner’s (2011, p. 321) argument is 
that corporate governance revolves around two power constituencies - the board and the 
shareholders - and that the 2007 crisis was occasioned by board oversight failures, meaning 
that the shareholders did not monitor the boards adequately. The reason for shareholder 
failures arises from the fact that shareholder ownership is either concentrated or dispersed. 
In concentrated ownership, corporate governance aims to constrain the block holder’s (the 
majority shareholder) power by strongly emphasizing the interest of other stakeholders 
such as employees and creditors. The other ownership structure referred to as dispersed 
ownership is fragmented. In this case, corporate governance seeks to protect minority 
shareholders who lack voting power. It can therefore be inferred that Kenyan shareholders 
are dispersed in theory and that the Capital Markets Authority‘s objective in their corporate 
governance framework is to protect the minority.
Coffee (2005) applied the same theory in explaining why there are more corporate 
scandals in the US than in the UK. He theorizes that the corporate governance of majority-
owned corporations (predominant in Europe) should be fundamentally different than corporate 
governance of corporations that lack a controlling shareholder group (predominant in the 
U.S.). It is not necessarily because there are fewer incentives to rip off other shareholders, 
but the feasible means to do so will differ, thus explaining why there are fewer scandals in 
Europe. In his theory of corporate scandals, he argues that fraud is more easily accomplished 
by the misappropriation of the private benefits of control: authorization of related-party 
transactions at advantageous prices and below-market tender offers. This theory can be 
used to understand the 2011 Cooper Motor’s Cooperation (CMC - Kenya). In this scenario, a 
shareholder with a 24.8% interest who was a Director and Chair of the Board had his company 
conduct business with CMC Kenya. The net effect was that this sister company over billed 
CMC based on non-arms length transaction ranging in millions of shillings. Transactions 
arising out of relationship led to a dysfunctional board, suspension by the securities exchange 
and lose of confidence from partners including banks, auditors and franchise holders.
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Leblanc and Gillies (2003, p. 3) in their paper on the coming revolution argue that 
regulations that were developed in the 1990’s to govern corporations were based on very 
limited knowledge about the factors influencing corporate decisions. While they state that 
relatively little is known about why or how corporate scandals or failure occur or how and 
why key decisions were made or not made and why boards acted in a certain way, the 
reasons for these failures, broadly, irrationality of the markets, maximization of short term 
returns and personal greed, are still dominant. This reasoning has led to the theory that 
if that the task of the independent board is oversight responsibility of management, then 
these lapses must have been caused by the inability of the boards to operate effectively, 
which is in line with Brunner’s argument above of oversight failure by the board. Leblanc 
and Gillies continue to reason that many commentators see Board effectiveness in terms of 
the separation of chair and CEO, composition (independent and non independent directors) 
and board size and this has led to the proposed model below: 
BE = BS + BM + BP
DE = DI + DC + DB
Board effectiveness (BE) depends upon Board Structure (BS) +
Board Membership (BM) + Board Process (BP).
Director effectiveness (DE) depends upon Director
Independence (DI) + Director Competence (DC) + Director Behavior (DB)
Source: Leblanc and Gillies (2003, p. 9)
These models are based on arguments made by many commissions and think tanks 
that state it is board effectiveness that matters because there is no evidence linking board 
structure and corporate financial success. In many ways this model attempts to explain the 
real issues behind successful corporate governance i.e. Director Effectiveness. In Kenya and 
many emerging markets, the application of such models to explain corporate governance 
is uncommon yet most of the line items in the corporate governance models depict these 
variables.
Scope, Interest, and forces behind Corporate Governance
The scope of corporate governance is wide and CACG (2006) extends this to its 
impact on society in terms of corporate social responsibility (CSR) as well as its effects 
on shareholders, directors, employees and other stakeholders. In many countries, annual 
reports and audited accounts are now regarded as key sources of information on corporate 
governance and financial disclosures, with reports covering wide areas such the Board 
of Directors, Board Corporate Governance Committees (advice on governance standards), 
Board Audit and Risk Management Committees, Board Compensation Committees, 
Board Nomination Committees and Board Business Ethics Committees. Other important 
disclosures include shareholding structures, the number of meetings attended by each 
Director, conflict of interest statements, related party transactions and other disclosures.
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Since the Asian financial crisis in 1998, vigorous activities have been intensified to 
improve corporate governance. Consequently, society needs to reassure itself that corporate 
business enterprises are viable, sustainable and competitive and that corporations are held 
accountable and are competitive investments. The policies that have been put in place 
are designed to make sure that corporations comply with the legal framework, remain 
relevant and legitimate in society and that the rights of all shareholders are respected. 
Apart from financial crises and corporate failures and scandals, other factors that drive 
corporate governance at the international and local level include the fight against money 
laundering, corruption, bribery, and abuses of corporate power, shareholder activism, 
global governance revolution and the environment. On a local level, in Kenya, additional 
forces pushing for good corporate governance include the farmers’ dissatisfaction with the 
agricultural sector (coffee, sugar, tea, and cotton), corruption, nepotism, Savings Credit and 
Cooperative Societies (S ACCO’s), and economic growth and development. 
IFRS and the Accounting Framework
On the other hand, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have been noted 
as the other side of governance that focuses on disclosures that can help assess the financial 
performance and viability of an enterprise. IFRS are built from the standard conceptual 
framework known as the IASB. The structure of this conceptual framework specifies the 
following five concepts for the preparation and presentation of financial statements: 1) 
objectives of financial statements, 2) qualitative characteristics of financial statements, 3) 
Reporting Entity 4) Definition, recognition and measurement of the elements from which 
financial statements are constructed and 5) the concept of capital and capital maintenance. 
The IFRS are standards that explain how transactions should be accounted for and reported 
in the financial statements including minimum disclosures. The IFRS also provide guidelines 
that indicate the threshold at which reporting quality meets governance standards.
Robinson and Munter (2004) also state that high quality financial reporting is any overall 
financial reporting, including disclosures, which results in a fair presentation of a company’s 
operations (both earnings and cash flow) and financial position. According to the two, low 
quality financial reporting results from:
1. Applying standards but selecting alternatives that bias or distort reported results.
2. Using loopholes or bright-lines in accounting principles (e.g., the lessee has a capital lease if 
the present value of the lease payments is 90 percent or more of the property’s fair value)
3. Using unrealistic or inappropriate estimates and assumptions (e.g., using extraordinarily 
long depreciable lives for assets or unrealistically optimistic assumptions about the 
collectability of receivables and loans). 
4. Stretching accounting principles (e.g., using a narrowly defined rule on consolidation 
of special-purpose entities (SPEs) for a lease transaction to justify no consolidation of 
SPEs in other types of transactions). 
60 Erick r. Outa |The new international financial architecture: Lessons and experiences from Africa
5. Engaging in fraudulent financial reporting. Rather than low quality financial reporting, 
this category actually has no financial reporting quality at all. 
These five items explain that in many cases, financial statements certified as IFRS 
turn out not to be so, because in most corporate collapses unqualified financial statements 
have been signed. The same arguments are repeated by Saudagaran (2004) who states 
that high quality accounting systems produce comparable, reliable and relevant information 
to decision makers. Agrawal (2008) argues that IFRS will impact corporate governance as 
it (IFRS) involves an extensive use of judgment in the selection of appropriate accounting 
policies and alternative treatments at the time of adoption. Also, IFRS requires valuations 
and future forecasts, which will involve the use of estimates, assumptions and management 
judgment. It has been observed that the combination of all these factors can have a 
significant impact on an enterprise’s reported earnings and financial position. In this way, 
boards and audit committee must be prepared to understand and play this role effectively. 
According to Agrawal (2008), investors, analysts and stakeholders may view earnings 
restatements negatively if the five items above are not taken into consideration.
There are numerous IFRS proponents who support the view that global financial 
reporting has positive effects on the functioning of global markets since standard and quality 
information will be available to users – including investors. In addition to this, it has been 
noted that global firms incur huge costs when preparing, auditing and interpreting information 
prepared using different accounting standards in different countries. Consequently, IFRS 
proponents such as the IASB (previously IASC), the International Organization for Securities 
commission organization (I) and Barth et al. (2008) among others argue that the adoption 
of IFRS will contribute towards a reduction in the cost of capital. 
Although, there are calls for the universal adoption of IFRS including IASB, there is still 
considerable debate as to whether the adoption of IFRS is beneficial (Barth, Landsman & 
Lang, 2008, p. 1161 and Christensen, Lee & Walker 2008, p. 8). In this regard, consensus is 
yet to be reached on issues relating to improved accounting quality, reduced cost of capital, 
transparency and capital market effects.
Governance and IFRS Challenges in Africa and positive actions
Okeahalam and Akinboade (2003, p. 11) mention six items that constitute problems 
in Africa: Transition economies, a large number of state owned enterprises, a culture of 
corruption, a weak business environment and low financial intermediation all of which 
create extreme challenges. Many African economies started as socialist economies and 
over time have transitioned or are in the process of transitioning to capitalist economies 
involving privatization of enterprise and a reduction of government control. Some of these 
processes have involved massive corruption threatening many lives in their economies. 
Zambia is a leading example of this where privatization of the mines has created more 
problems that it has solved. 
In light of the growing recognition of the importance of Corporate Governance and 
Financial Reporting Standards, African states have embarked on initiatives to facilitate IFRS 
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adoption such as the newly launched Pan African Federation of Accountants (PAFA) in 
2011 and the Francophone Chartered Accountants int’l Federation (FIDEF). In this regard, 
positive country level steps have been seen in Lesotho, Mauritius, Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Ghana and the West African Monetary Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) 
(8 countries). In spite of these efforts, challenges such as adherence issues (Uganda), 
conflicts with national law (South Africa), enforcement mechanisms (Kenya and Mauritius), 
implementation guidelines (Tanzania), non-compliant accounting systems and software 
(WAEMU, CEMAC, OHADA/SYCOA) need to be addressed. CEMAC is the French acronym 
for the Economic Community for Central African States comprising Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of the Congo and Gabon. OHADA is a 
system of business laws and institutional implementations adopted by sixteen West and 
Central African nations. It is the French acronym for “Organization pour l’Harmonisation 
en Afrique du Droit des Affaires”, which translates into English as “Organization for the 
Harmonization of Business Law in Africa”.
It can therefore be said that IFRS acceptances has gained momentum and has had an 
impact on Africa, although a lot still needs to be done on the observance of standards and 
codes according to various World Bank reports.
Other initiatives in Africa towards the adoption and implementation of good corporate 
governance include the Africa Peer Review mechanism (APRM), an initiative under which 
26 African leaders agreed to submit their countries and themselves to a peer review on 
selected areas of governance under the New Economic Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD). NEPAD is a programme of the African Union (AU) adopted in Lusaka, Zambia in 
2001. NEPAD is a radically new intervention, spearheaded by African leaders to pursue 
new priorities and approaches to the political and socio-economic transformation of Africa. 
NEPAD’s objective is to enhance Africa’s growth, development and participation in the 
global economy.
This initiative is similar to those promoted by regional bodies in other parts of the world. 
Montgomery (2007) cites results from 25 meetings of roundtables sponsored by the OECD in 
which 6 factors emerged as challenges. These included enforcement, ownership and control, 
shareholder rights and equitable treatment, responsibilities of the board, transparency and 
disclosure as well as the role of stakeholders. This list is very similar to the contents of 
many corporate governance codes. CACG (2006, pp.76-79) concurs with Montgomery 
but expands the list to include concentrated ownership structures, ineffective regulatory 
and judiciary systems, underdeveloped institutional capacities, limited underutilized human 
capital skills and capabilities, preponderance of small/fragmented economies, corrupt 
complex bureaucracies, expensive financing, heavy foreign debt and insignificant capital 
market. CACG’s list is significant for emerging economies in Africa because 25 out of 40 
highly indebted countries are in Africa, and 22 out of the 30 least literate countries are in 
Africa. The continent is also bedeviled by limited access to the Internet, phone, electricity 
and safe water. The CACG report makes an interesting observation that Africa constitutes 
only 1.8% of international trade and all these factors continue to complicate the governance 
situation in Africa.
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Governance and IFRS Lessons: Global comparative analysis
Lessons from around the world on the magnitude of losses and their impact 
on society do prove the need to ensure no more governance lapses. While the list 
depicts direct losses, others including the reputation of the firms involved shouldn’t 
be overlooked. Some of the reasons cited for these failures include lapses in auditing, 
hiding loans or losses, insider trading and inflated revenue. The New York Times on 
16/6/2002 listed top institutions including Arthur Andersen, Delloite & Touché, Ernst 
and Young, KPMG and PWC alongside other corporations. This section summarizes 
some of the consequences of corporate failures and scandals both in and outside 
Africa (See Table 1).
Table 1. Summary of key corporate scandals (global and local)
Organization Region Loss Sentence Response
1 WorldCom-Biggest 
Telecommunications 
company in the US
USA $11 billion 
Accounting Fraud 
(Inflated profits) 
in 2002
1.CEO-B 
Ebbers-25 years 
in prison
Sarbanes 
Oxley Act –
July 2002
2 Enron-7th largest 
company in USA
USA Pervasive fraud 
and conspiracy 
leading to 
Bankruptcy. 
$68 billion 
wiped in market 
capital,9000 
left jobless and 
eroded retirement 
savings-2001
1.CEO-J 
Skilling-24 years 
in prison
2. CFO-A.
Fastow-10 years 
in prison
3. Treasurer-G.
Glisan-5 years in 
prison.
Sarbanes 
Oxley Act –
July 2002
3 Adelphia 
Communications-
US 5th largest cable 
company
USA Multi billion dollar 
fraud involving 
securities fraud, 
conspiracy, bank 
fraud and duping 
members
1.Founder-J.
Rigas-15 years in 
prison
2. Son and CFO 
Timothy-20 years
Sarbanes 
Oxley Act –
July 2002
4 Tyco International USA Looting the 
company of $150 
million
1.CEO 
D.Kozlowski-8-25 
years and 
repay $167 M 
2.Associate-M.
Swartz 8-25 
years and repay 
$72M 
Sarbanes 
Oxley Act –
July 2002
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Organization Region Loss Sentence Response
5. Rite Aid Corp-US 3rd 
largest pharmacy 
chain
USA Billion dollar 
Accounting Fraud 
that sent the 
company’s stock 
tumbling in 1999
1. CEO-M. 
Grass-8 years 
and $500 fine
2.CFO-
Bergonzi-28 
months in prison
Sarbanes 
Oxley Act –
July 2002
6 Parmalat-largest 
food Co. in Italy and 
4th largest in the 
world with 34,000 
employees
Italy Multi billion Euro 
scandal
7 Siemens AG Germany Corruption by 
bribing employees 
of other 
companies to win 
contracts
Fined Euro 1 
billion to settle 
corruption 
charges, fines, 
back taxes, and 
late interest
8 National Aids 
Control Council
Kenya Inflated salaries 
and benefits-
ksh 27 million 
($330,000)
CEO jailed for 
3 years but 
released
Anti 
Corruption 
and 
Economic 
crimes act 
9 Dolphin Group of 
Companies
Kenya Stealing ksh 112 
million($1.4million)
CEO jailed for 2 
years 
No policy 
response
10 Uchumi 
Supermarkets
Kenya Company went 
bankrupt and was 
delisted
Six directors 
charged in 
Court and later 
released
Life boat 
by the 
government
11 United Insurance Kenya Company went 
bankrupt
No known 
sanctions
Strengthen-
ed insurance 
Act
12 Euro Bank Kenya Closed down None Banking act
13 Lake Star Insurance Kenya Bankrupt No known 
sanction
Strengthen-
ed insurance 
Act
14 KCC Ltd Kenya Collapsed and 
later revived
No known 
sanction
Strengthen-
ed insurance 
Act
Continued Table 1. Summary of key corporate scandals (global and local)
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Organization Region Loss Sentence Response
15 Kenya National 
Assurance Company
Kenya Biggest Assurance 
Company went 
bankrupt, jobs and 
assets lost.
No action taken 
on directors
No action
16 Charter Bank Kenya Alleged tax and 
ethical issues
No action No action
17 BCCI Bank Ltd Kenya Badly managed 
/no regard to 
regulations and 
closed down
No action No action
18 CMC Motor 
Corporation
Kenya Corporate 
governance failure
Declined 
performance and 
loss of confidence
Review 
of CMA 
guidelines
19 Kenya Bus Service 
(Stage Coach)
Kenya Collapsed due to 
unlevel playing 
field and political 
interference
No action No action
20 33 Banks in 1985 Kenya Banks collapsed 
due to political and 
corrupt practices. 
ksh 17.8 billion 
(6% of GDP ) lost
No known 
actions
Review of 
Banking Act
18 HIH Insurance-2nd 
largest insurance co 
in Australia 
Australia In liquidation by 
15/3/2001 and 
losses up to A$ 
5.3 billion
Conviction and 
imprisonment of 
some managers
No known 
action
19 CMC Holdings 
Kenya 
Kenya Accounting 
and Corporate 
governance 
issues leading 
to court battles, 
suspension from 
listing and sale of 
the company.
Some directors 
barred from 
directorships of 
listed companies, 
loss of franchise 
and dealerships 
together with 
reputation issues.
CMA 
corporate 
governance 
blue print 
2014 and 
corporate 
governance 
guidelines 
2014.
20 Regal Bank South 
Africa
Fraud and 
Contravening the 
Companies Act 
and King III Report 
leading to collapse 
in 2001. Corporate 
Governance Issues.
CEO Jeff 
Levenstein Jailed 
for 15 years in 
2013
Source: Author (collected from various sources)
Continued Table 1. Summary of key corporate scandals (global and local)
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Enhancing Transparency and Accountability (ROSC reports)
According to NIFA, enhancing transparency and accountability is critical to achieving 
World Economic stability and minimizing the impact of global economic crisis. Countries 
can achieve this through compliance with the International Accounting Standards (IFRS) 
issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International 
Standards on Auditing (ISA) issued by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). 
Findings on country code compliance with standards are reported by World Bank observer 
teams known as Report on Standards and Observation of Codes (ROSC) and the Financial 
Standards Compliance Index.
ROSC Compliance
The World Bank’s Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) targeting 
its member countries on the implementation of international accounting and auditing 
standards for strengthening the financial reporting regime (World Bank, 2010) has been 
an indicator of compliance. The general findings of this program over the past decade 
continuously show that gaps still exist between domestic and international standards and 
that these gaps need to be closed so the financial reports generated are of high quality 
(Transparent, relevant, reliable and comparable) (See Table 2).
Table 2: Summary of Selected African ROSC findings include:
Country ROSC Findings
1 Nigeria
2011
1. Limited implementation of the 2004 Country Action Plan (6 of 14) 
leaving significant areas not implemented.
2.Limited improvement in financial reporting practices 
3.A number of banks exploited loopholes in Nigerian accounting and 
auditing standards, weak capacity of the regulatory bodies and weak 
enforcement, employed creative accounting to boost their balance 
sheets These weaknesses in financial reporting, auditing and accounting 
contributed to Nigeria’s banking sector crisis valued at between N1.5 - N2 
trillion. 
4. Further progress includes the adoption of IFRS and promulgation of the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) bill. The government has announced 
the adoption of IFRS as of January 1, 2012, for publicly listed entities and 
significant public interest entities.
2 Kenya
2010
 Improvements noted but gaps still exist in financial reporting and more 
effort should target strengthening the capacity of the regulators and 
ensuring compliance with applicable standards and codes. Savings and 
credit cooperatives (SACCO), which control up to 30% of the countries 
GDP and a crucial part of financial intermediation, are badly affected.
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Country ROSC Findings
3 South 
Africa
2003
1. High profile cases of corporate failures in 2000’s gave rise to serious 
discussions about the quality of corporate audits. Inquiry commissions, 
specifically the Nel Commission, highlighted various problems, including 
issues related to auditor efficiency and independence.
2. Ten years of discussions on revisions to the legislative framework for 
accounting and auditing have contributed to uncertainties in the profession.
3. Immediate steps are needed for enacting the Financial Reporting Bill, 
amendments to the Companies Act, and the Accountancy Professions Bill; 
and ensuring proper enforcement of established statutory requirements. 
4 Rwanda
2008
1. Considerable effort made to align its accounting and auditing practices 
with internationally accepted standards and codes.
2. Has taken effective steps for strengthening all the pillars of accounting and 
auditing infrastructure in line with international good practices. 
3.There are varying compliance gaps in both accounting and auditing practices. 
These gaps stem from a lack of a clear understanding among practicing 
accountants and auditors regarding the requirements of internationally 
accepted standards, inadequate technical capacities of regulators, absence 
of implementation guidance, lack of independent oversight for the auditing 
profession, and shortcomings in professional education and training. 
5 Mauri-tius 
2011
1. Significant improvements in financial reporting practices in Mauritius. 
5 of the 8 key policy recommendations implemented and activities have 
been initiated to address the other 3 recommendations.
2. The Financial Reporting Act, enacted in 2004, resulted in the 
establishment of a Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and Mauritius 
Institute of Professional Accountants (MIPA).
3. Legislation — Companies Act, Banking Act, and Insurance Act — was 
amended to ensure consistency in the corresponding financial reporting 
requirements. Enhanced Staff at the registrar of Companies.
6 Ghana
2004
1. Accounting and auditing practices suffer from institutional weaknesses 
with regulations, compliance, and enforcement of standards and rules. 
2. National ethical requirements for auditors are not in line with 
international requirements.
3. Full compliance with National Accounting Standards is not readily 
achieved; some listed companies inappropriately claim compliance with 
International Accounting Standards. 
4. There is inadequate adherence to auditing standards and professional ethics. 
5. Apart from the banking sector, monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms are ineffective. 
6.Poor quality accounting education and training
Table 2 (Continued). Summary of Selected African ROSC findings include:
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Country ROSC Findings
7 Congo
(Brazza-
ville)
2010
1.The accounting and auditing obligations of businesses and entities in 
the financial sector are set out in the regulations of the Organization for 
the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), supplemented by 
the COBAC rules for banks, the CIMA code for insurance companies, and 
CIPRES for social security funds. The accounting standards applicable 
are those established in the OHADA Accounting System (SYSCOHADA). 
Exercise of the accounting profession is regulated by the CEMAC 
authorities in the zone, but no legal or regulatory text has been adopted 
to organize the profession or to establish auditing standards. The OHADA 
regulatory texts concerning accounting standards have evolved very little 
since coming into force because the national and community structures 
responsible for adapting them to changes in the accounting, economic, and 
legal environment are not functioning.
8 Uganda
2005
1. Full compliance with IAS/IFRS not yet readily achieved, and inadequate 
adherence to auditing standards and professional ethics. 
2. Apart from the financial institutions and listed companies, monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms are ineffective. 
3. Inadequate accounting education at university level, lack of teaching 
materials on international standards, lack of monitored and controlled 
practical training.
9 Egypt
2002
 1. Significant efforts to align corporate financial reporting requirements 
with the International Accounting Standards (IAS) and to close the 
“compliance gap” in both accounting and auditing practices. Consequently, 
important improvements have been achieved in accounting and disclosure 
requirements for publicly traded companies and financial institutions and in 
Egyptian Accounting Standards as benchmarked against IAS. 
2. A new Accounting Practice Law has been drafted and agreed upon by 
all stakeholders, 
Source: http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc _ nigeria.htm
Table 2 (Continued). Summary of Selected African ROSC findings include:
It can be seen that throughout Africa, weak capacity of regulatory bodies, weak 
monitoring and enforcement, lack of independent oversight of the auditing profession and 
general institutional weaknesses cut across the continent weakening financial reporting and 
attendant investor confidence. 
Financial Standards Compliance Index
It is widely recognized that global financial stability rests on robust national systems, 
and therefore requires enhanced measures at the country level. (ROSC Uganda 2008, p.1). 
In a world of integrated capital markets, financial crises in individual countries can imperil 
international financial stability. This provides a basic “public goods” rationale for minimum 
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standards, which benefit international and individual national systems. In this context, 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) initiated the Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), which cover twelve internationally recognized 
core standards and codes relevant to economic stability and private and financial sector 
development. The Financial Standards Compliance Index is made up of 12 key standards 
covering macroeconomic policy and data transparency, institutional market infrastructure 
and financial regulation and supervision. Africa has not fared well on these standards as 
can be seen in the table below. It can be seen that only two countries in Africa achieved 
a medium score while the other eight score ‘low’ and ‘very low’. Since this data relates 
to some of the top economies in Africa, it can be argued that the financial standards 
compliance index is quite low meaning the 12 indicators above have not been sufficiently 
complied with. This is in total contrast to the EU and the US where the compliance index is 
considered high (See Table 3). 
Table 3. Selected Country Financial Standards Compliance Index.
The European Union and the US African Markets
Index 
Score
Rank Compliance 
level
Index 
Score
Rank Compliance 
level
1 Netherlands 73.33 1 High 1 S Africa 55.83 23 Medium
2 Italy 72.5 2 High 2 Morocco 45.83 43 Medium
3 Denmark 70.00 3 High 3 Tunisia 36.67 59 Low
4 Australia 69.17 4 High 4 Egypt 34.17 63 Low
5 UK 68.33 5 High 5 Ghana 28.33 70 Low
6 France 65.83 6 High 6 Tanzania 25.83 71 Low
7 USA 65.00 7 High 7 Kenya 24.17 74 Low
8 Norway 63.33 8 High 8 Algeria 14.17 85 Very low
9 Belgium 62.5 9 High 9 Nigeria 11.67 87 Very low
10 Germany 62.5 10 High 10 Cameroon 9.17 89 Very low
Source: http://www.estandardsforum.org (2009) latest statistics not published
Strengthening Domestic Financial Systems (corporate governance)
Under NIFA, the principles and policies that foster the development of stable, efficient 
financial systems include corporate governance. The findings of this study are based on 
the implementation status of corporate governance codes that indicate material items to 
be reported upon. Most codes expect that a report on good corporate governance should 
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ensure timely and accurate disclosures of all material information regarding the corporation 
to stakeholders. Generally and around the world, the key contents of corporate governance 
codes include compliance with guidelines on corporate governance codes and reasons 
for non compliance, establishment of board and board committees, supply and disclosure 
of information, election of directors, resignation of directors, AGM’s, a balanced board, 
best practices relating to the rights of shareholders and an effective audit committee. It is 
however noted that good corporate governance may not survive in a place where country 
governance is still questionable. Governance in African countries has in many instances 
not measured up to many global standards and this has contributed to poor corporate 
governance. Some African countries have been under military rule or non-democratic 
civilian governments (Zimbabwe) and this has not helped corporate governance either (See 
Table 4). 
Table 4. Selected African Corporate Governance Findings
Country (s) Observations
1 Nigeria-2009 The Securities Exchange Commission directed that 
all listed companies must release their financial 
results to all stock market operators and the press 
(Transparency and disclosure)
2 South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Uganda and Ghana -2009
Have put in place institutions to promote good 
governance (Institute of Directors, Centre for 
Corporate Governance (CCG)) and relevant 
legislation
3 South Africa-2010 Corporate Governance recognized as an objective 
for efficient utilization and management of assets 
as evidenced by the King I, II, and III reports and 
Financial Reporting legislation
4 Botswana, Senegal, Tunisia, 
Mali, Namibia, Cameroun, 
Gambia, Mozambique, Sierra 
Leone and Zambia-2009
Received technical awareness and training from 
the World Bank and Commonwealth Secretariat 
but impact has not translated into real terms
Most Corporate Governance information is availed through the annual reports and audited 
financial statements of organizations. Annual reports and audited financial statements in 
Kenya like many other countries contain information on company objectives, management 
structures, shareholders and voting rights, board compensation, key executives, board 
charter/conduct, board responsibilities, meetings, accountability, enterprise risk, succession 
planning, shareholding structures.
This study has analyzed two cases in Africa’s two largest economies shown in 
appendixes 3 and 4. Ned Bank South Africa is a strong Africa focused bank whose strategy 
is currently under threat following an alliance with Eco bank that trades on three West 
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Africa exchanges. The study depicts possible loss and harm to the relationship where the 
reputation of one partner is questionable and disclosure is being avoided. The Cadbury 
Nigeria Case is a near Enron style case where compliance with regulation and falsifying 
financial statements characterized a scandal in a multinational listed on the Lagos Securities 
Exchange. Penalties and damages were incurred directly and indirectly.
Discussion of Findings and Recommendations
From ROSC reports on financial standards compliance and corporate governance, it 
appears that there is still more to be done. While it has been seen that a foundation has 
been laid, the impact of governance measured in wealth creation has not been felt in many 
parts of Africa. The Nigeria ROSC report for 2011 paints a grim picture showing that most 
recommendations have not been adopted and this has led to a financial crisis in that country. 
While the annual reports of many companies in Africa have indicated increased attention to 
governance reporting it is many people’s opinion that the reports are not sufficient evidence 
of governance compliance. Many reports show board responsibilities and don’t indicate 
any separation between the roles of the Chair, the CEO and management. Many conflicts 
of interest exist and no mechanisms for dealing with them. Directors resign often but no 
reasons are given and where professional advice is necessary, there is no evidence on how 
it is obtained. The development of ethical behavior in most institutions isn’t clear as code 
of conduct executions lack clarity. Many companies in Africa do not indicate the corporate 
governance codes they have applied and many countries have not clearly spelt out how this 
should be done and the consequences.
Some suggestions border on the fact that some regulators and governments think 
that codes and standards may not be suitable for Africa. Singh and Newberry (2008, p. 
484) suggest that those seeking IFRS for developing countries may need to devise an 
acceptable solution and obtain inside access to the standard-setting process to achieve 
this aim. However, this is unlikely to happen in emerging economies because they seem to 
be consumers of IFRS and are not part of the creation process. 
Other recommendations on good corporate governance challenge the effectiveness of 
the audit committees responsible for overseeing the work of the auditors and independently 
review the workings of the organization. According to The Accountant (2006), the Enron 
audit committee carried out its duty in a cursory manner with some members missing 
meetings up to 75% of the time. In the case of HIH (Lipton, 2003) insurance in Australia, 
their terms of reference and minutes indicated they were only concerned with the accounts 
and the figures and never focused on risk management or internal controls with the 
meetings attended by everyone including the executive directors thus leading to a failure 
to attend to the risks faced by the company and a serious conflict of interest. Coffee 
(2005) suggests that any difficulty in achieving auditor independence in a corporation 
with a controlling shareholder may also imply that minority shareholders in concentrated 
ownership economies should directly select their own gatekeepers - a suggestion that can 
be complex to implement.
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The Accountant (2006) argues that failure to grasp the concept of conflict of interest 
can also lead to serious flaws. In the case of CMC Motors Group in Kenya, the annual 
governance report clearly indicated there was no conflict of interest, but events within the 
company did show that the directors and the chairman had been doing business with the 
company leading to serious conflicts of interest among many other issues. 
In line with the above, Bruner (2011, p. 319) argues that governance codes such 
as the new code proposed by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the UK, will 
enhance the quality of engagement between institutional investors and companies and 
accommodate the seven principles included in the code. Unsurprisingly, the principles 
are not new; they simply reflect what appears in several suggestions. These principles 
include (1) disclosure of investor stewardship policies; (2) adoption of a robust policy 
for managing conflicts of interest; (3) active monitoring of all related companies; (4) 
adoption of clear guidelines on when and how to escalate activities as a method of 
protecting and enhancing shareholder value; (5) willingness to act collectively with other 
investors where appropriate; (6) adoption of voting policies; and (7) periodic reporting on 
stewardship and voting activities.
Conclusions
This study has applied a literature review to assess the continent’s response to 
NIFA suggestions regarding economic stability. The review looked at transparency and 
accountability as well as the strengthening of domestic markets. The findings include weak 
regulatory bodies, weak monitoring and enforcement, lack of independent oversight of 
the auditing profession and general institutional weaknesses with improvements over the 
years. World Bank ROSC reports also indicated lapses in IFRS implementation. Compliance 
with NIFA is therefore still low and guidelines are not fully followed. This is made manifested 
by recurrent financial crises, courtroom battles, suspensions and stock market delisting as 
well as challenges to reputations, some of which have trickledown effects for the economic 
development of the countries, with Nigeria being a case in point. It is therefore concluded 
that NIFA compliance is still low and ongoing efforts are still necessary for improving 
Africa’s corporate governance and IFRS mechanisms so that wealth creation and resource 
management can trickle down to the wider population and reduce discontent among the 
population. 
Future research could dwell on corporate governance and IFRS and state owned 
enterprises, corporate governance mechanisms, corporate governance and impact on 
poverty alleviation, enforcement of appropriate codes and relationship between corporate 
governance and country governance indicators.
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Appendixes
Appendix 1: Selected African Economic Indicators-2012
Indicators GDP
$billions
Real growth 
GDP %
Global 
Competitiveness 
rank
Population
in millions
1 South Africa 524.0 2.5 1 51
2 Egypt 497.8 2.2 13 81
3 Nigeria 377.9 6.9 18 155
4 Algeria 251.1 2.5 14 36.4
5 Morocco 151.4 3.2 4 32
11 Kenya 66.3 4.2 12 41
Total Africa 2,390.0 5.6 1,072
Source: Various World Bank Reports
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Appendix 2: Selected African Government Indicators (2012 Updated 
Sept 2013)
Indicator Kenya
South 
Africa
Nigeria Egypt Algeria Morocco
1.Corruption Control: 
Estimated -1.0965 -0.15195 -1.1327 -0.5725 -0.5363 -0.4141
2.Government 
Effectiveness: 
Estimated
-0.5453 0.325243 -0.9977 -0.7688 -0.5530 -0.0448
3.Political Stability 
and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism: 
Estimated
-1.2931 -0.0042 -2.0532 -1.4810 -1.3407 -0.4596
4.Regulatory Quality: 
Estimated -0.3101 0.378586 -0.7224 -0.4895 -1.2926 -0.0921
5.Voice and 
Accountability: 
Estimated
-0.2989 0.559563 -0.7275 -0.7378 -0.9143 -0.6062
Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.
aspx?source=worldwide-governance-indicators#
-2.5 Weakest and 2.5 Strongest
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset summarizing the 
views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and 
expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. This data is gathered from 
a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international 
organizations, and private sector firms. 
1. Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by 
elites and private interests.
2. Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and its 
degree of independence from political pressures, the policy formulation and implementation 
quality, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.
3. Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown 
by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism.
4. Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
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5. Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media.
Appendix 3: NED Bank South Africa and Eco Bank Nigeria 2013
Ned bank South Africa traces its roots back to 1831 in Amsterdam but is now a South 
African bank with an African focus and at the end of 2012 it had a market capitalization of 
US $9 billion. Its asset base then was US $80.5 billion with 28,000 employees and it was 
listed on the Johannesburg Security Exchange (JSE). It resisted an HSBC buyout in 2010 
but deepened its strategic alliance with Eco Bank, which operates in 36 African states 
and is traded on the Ghana, Nigeria and Ivory Coast Security Exchanges. The alliance was 
to provide facilities to support Eco Bank’s corporate development programs including its 
transformational banking acquisition in Nigeria and in so doing secured the right to acquire 
up to 20% of Eco Bank Transnational Inc. It loaned Eco Bank $285m to help it acquire 
Nigeria Oceanic Bank and in the West African press, Eco Bank claimed it had a similar 
right to subscribe to 20% of Ned Bank under an unclear arrangement. The Ned Bank press 
statement did not mention these reciprocal arrangements which were in perpetuity.
These arrangements required shareholder approval from both sides given the significant 
dilution it would have for Ned Bank and neither bank included this in their annual report in 
spite of their significance.
While no court cases have been filed nor has impropriety been found, an analyst’s 
presentation indicated that the 2.478 million new shares to be acquired with the $285 
million loan would convert to 11.5 us cents per share whereas the shares were trading at 9c 
in Lagos and would only represent a 12.6% share of the company. To acquire the full 20%, 
Ned Bank would have to buy the additional shares at market rates resulting in an additional 
$164 million on top of the loan.
In the course of the year allegations of fraud by the chairman and CEO of Eco Bank of 
writing off debts to a company owned by the chairman and selling assets on the cheap to 
related parties appeared and these investigations are ongoing by Nigerian regulators. It 
also surfaced that Oceanic Bank, the purchase which was financed by Ned Bank collapsed 
in 2008 under Nigeria Central Bank management under claims of fraud. Two South African 
Companies, Ethos Private Equity and Old Mutual Private Equity lost fortunes in the bank. The 
matters got even more clouded as the Public Investment Corporation of South Africa, which 
holds 6.5% of Ned bank and whose operations include acquiring African assets, is also a 
major shareholder of Eco Bank.
The issue that is a concern in South Africa is lack of progress in the regulator’s 
investigation of the alleged Eco Bank transactions with its related parties which are thought 
to be lacking in corporate governance and a possible early warning sign. The outcome of 
these investigations will shed light on the options available to Ned Bank as it is believed it 
could suffer potential losses but, worse still, the question of why such a transaction exists if 
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there are questions regarding the leadership reputation of the entities involved. Even though 
both banks are giants and their stocks are trading, these disclosure failures are worrying, 
may have serious implications and have obviously put a check on Ned Bank’s Pan African 
strategy.
1. Corporate Governance scandal threatens Ned bank’s Africa Strategy.
http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2013/10/21/corporate-governance-
scandal-threatens-nedbanks-africa-strategy . Stuart Theobald, 21 October 2013, 07:37
Appendix 4: Cadbury Nigeria PLC 2006 - Overstatement in 
Financial Statements
Cadbury Nigeria was founded in 1965 as a subsidiary of Cadbury Schweppes, a major 
global player in confectionery and beverages markets with operations in 200 countries 
and 40,000 employees. Cadbury Nigeria engages in the manufacture and sale of sugar 
confectionery, gum and food beverages in two segments. It owns the Stanmark Cocoa 
Processing Company. 
In October 2006, the board of Cadbury Nigeria PLC notified the world, including 
its stockholders and regulatory bodies, that it had discovered “Overstatements” in 
its accounts, which, in its words, had spanned many years. It quickly appointed Price 
WaterHouseCoopers, an independent auditing firm to investigate these “Overstatements,” 
and they submitted a report that the overstatement could be around 13-15 billion naira 
($90 million) leading to a provision for a 15 million pounds goodwill impairment from 
the transaction. The overstatement was first detected after due diligence performed by 
Cadbury UK when increasing its acquisition from 46 to 50%. Analysts and reports from 
Nigeria indicated several lapses.
Sales and stock buybacks were reported including false stock certifications. 
Overstatement of profits, misrepresentation of sales and false supplier certificates 
characterized the financial statements. In 2006, the year of the scandal, the company 
recorded a loss of $15 million with more expected, and share prices dropped 5-26%. 
Offshore compensation of certain senior employees was detected and this had not been 
authorized by the compensation committee as required by policy.
Other analysts and members of the Nigerian institute of Directors pointed at serious 
governance issues including a failure of board oversight functions. The CFO and CEO 
exercised delegated powers and after the US Enron debacle, directors learned and were 
expected to pay close attention to the affairs of the company. Even more interestingly, the 
audit committee was made up of 3 executive directors, contrary to the code of practice. 
Internal control and organization, integrity, audit committee, external auditors and the entire 
management were cited as having been problematic because of their failure to comply and 
detect the irregularities that led to this overstatement. Questions were raised regarding 
whistle blowing and why it didn’t work. Why didn’t the banks scrutinize the financial 
statements before lending any money? 
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Lastly, the Union Registrars, the filing company for Cadbury Nigeria with the duty to 
report to the SEC any actual or suspected breach, infringement or non-compliance with any 
SEC rules and regulations in the Nigerian code of corporate governance failed. However, the 
Union Registrars did not pay dividends and failed to notify SEC in writing as required when 
Cadbury Nigeria failed to transfer dividend payments to shareholders within 7 business 
days.
What was the damage? A scandal of this magnitude is always very expensive. The CFO, 
CEO and all the officials that presided over this company were disqualified from operating 
in the Nigerian Capital Market thus denting many people’s careers. The Company suffered 
heavy penalties and their shares listing was suspended while the registrar and the auditors 
received penalties for their roles. The loss of share value from a loss of public confidence, 
the damage to the Cadbury brand, the reputation of the external auditor associated with 
the big 4 and the 300 shareholders suing the company for breach of duty all complicated 
the matter.
1. Corporate Governance Issues in Financial Reporting-The Cadbury Challenge
 http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/oladele-o-solanke/corporate-
governance-issues-in-financial-reporting-the-cadbury-challenge.html
2. An evaluation of the limitations of the corporate governance codes in preventing 
corporate collapses in Nigeria.
 http://iosrjournals.org/iosr-jbm/papers/Vol7-issue2/P072110118.pdf
